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Abstract 
 
 This paper examines behavior in a tournament in which we vary the tournament prize 
structure and the information available about participants' skill at the task of solving mazes.  The 
number of solved mazes is lowest when payments are independent of performance; higher when 
a single, large prize is given; and highest when multiple, differentiated prizes are given.  This 
result is strongest when we inform participants about the number of mazes they and others 
solved in a pre-tournament round.  Some participants reported that they solved more mazes than 
they actually solved, and this misreporting also peaked with multiple differentiated prizes. 
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Tournament models predict that total effort is maximized by giving multiple prizes rather 
than a single prize, given a constant total tournament purse, heterogeneous skills, and a convex 
cost for participants of putting forth effort (Benny Moldovanu and Aner Sela 2001).  Multiple 
prizes give more participants an incentive to work hard than does a single large prize, which 
many participants may have little chance of winning.  Prizes unrelated to output produce low 
effort as participants see no return to effort.  While the theory is clear, there is little empirical 
work examining how behavior responds to differing prize structures or to information about 
participants’ level of ability at the tournament task.  Behavioral economics adds potential twists 
to traditional tournament theory, including suggesting that incentives may crowd out intrinsic 
motivation (Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini 2000).   
 
This study uses a maze-solving experiment to assess behavior under different tournament 
prize structures and different information given to participants.  We asked groups of six subjects 
to solve a set of mazes in two rounds.2  In Round 1 of the experiment, we rewarded individuals 
by piece rates so that their reward depended only on their own performance.  After the groups 
completed Round 1, we told participants in half of the groups about the distribution of mazes 
solved in Round 1 in their group, but we did not tell participants in the other half of the groups 
about the distribution in their groups.    
 
In Round 2 of the experiment, we gave three incentive treatments: a treatment that paid 
each person the same regardless of performance; a treatment with one large prize for the 
tournament winner; and a treatment with multiple prizes that increased with a participant’s rank 
in the tournament.  Total prize money was constant across the three incentive treatments.  We 
measured the effects of the six treatments—three prize treatments in each information 
environment—on effort by measuring the number of mazes individuals solved.  
 
Using the total number of mazes solved as a measure of output, we find that output is 
lowest when payments to participants are independent of performance; higher when only a single 
large prize is given; and highest when we give multiple differentiated prizes.  While we cannot 
pinpoint the prize structure corresponding to the global maximum among the infinite number of 
                                                 
2 Gneezy, Muriel Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) use maze-solving to gauge the effort of subjects. 
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possible allocations of a fixed tournament prize budget, our results demonstrate that consistent 
with the theory, multiple differentiated prizes in some form can produce higher output than either 
one single prize or prizes unrelated to performance.  
 
We also find that multiple prizes yield the highest output relative to the other incentive 
conditions when participants know the number of mazes they and others solved in Round 1.  The 
differences in output among the conditions are, moreover, driven largely by the different 
responses to incentives of subjects with high or low maze solving ability, seemingly in response 
to the different marginal returns to effort in specific prize and information settings.  When 
subjects knew the distribution of solved mazes from Round 1, those lower in the ability 
distribution solved more mazes with multiple prizes than they did with the single prize condition; 
while by contrast, those higher in the ability distribution solved similar numbers of mazes with 
multiple prizes as under the single prize condition.  Lower-ability subjects produce little when 
they know they have little chance of winning a single prize through more effort.  When subjects 
did not know the distribution of solved mazes from Round 1, the single and multiple prize 
treatments produced similar outcomes across the ability distribution—suggesting that when 
individuals did not know they ranked poorly in ability, they did not “give up” on winning the 
single prize. 
 
The experiments closest to ours (Weiland Müller and Andrew Schotter 2004; Haig 
Nalbantian and Schotter 1997) examine how tournament prize structure affects effort but not 
how information interacts with incentives or how incentives and information differently affect 
individuals with different ability levels.  They also investigate tournaments in which the 
experimenter gives subjects "cost-of-effort" functions instead of asking them to perform real 
tasks.3  Niederle and Lise Vesterlund (2007) compare the decisions of men and women to enter a 
tournament.  Ronald Ehrenberg and Michael Bognanno (1990) find that golf tournaments have 
incentive effects but do not study the provision of information or which distribution of prizes 
maximizes effort.  Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay, and Imran Rasul (2007) and Clive Bull, 
Schotter, and Keith Weigelt (1987) compare piece rates and tournaments. 
                                                 
3 Müller and Schotter (2004) find that some participants work hard in tournaments while others effectively drop out.  
Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) find that relative performance schemes outperform target-based schemes. 
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We did not plan to examine cheating in our experiment but the paper and pencil maze 
technology that we used allowed subjects to falsely report unsolved mazes as solved.  This 
serendipitously provides an independent test of the impact of incentives on behavior and a new 
approach to detecting cheating in the laboratory.  As some form of cheating is widespread in 
many real-world contexts (e.g. Brian Jacob and Steven Levitt 2003), our experiment provides an 
analog to a common setting.  In our experiment, the extent of misreporting varied with incentives 
in a similar way as did the number of mazes solved.   
 
Section I describes the experiment.  Section II presents the main results.  Section III 
discusses results relating to cheating in the experiment.  Section IV concludes. 
 
I. The Experiment 
 
Our experiment recruited participants from the Harvard Business School Computer Lab 
for Experimental Research subject pool.  We asked subjects to solve a set of mazes from Dave 
Phillips (1988, 1991) in a group with six participants. The experiment had two rounds, each 
lasting for 15 minutes: a piece rate incentive session (Round 1) and a tournament session (Round 
2).  The maze packet used for Round 2 contained different mazes than those in the maze packet 
for Round 1.  We presented the mazes in the same order to all subjects.  The directions for each 
round and treatment are in the Appendix. 
 
The participants were paid a $13.00 show-up fee for participating in the experiment.  In 
Round 1 we paid each subject an additional 20 cents per maze solved to motivate effort.  We 
used the results under piece rates to identify their skill at solving mazes. At the end of Round 1, 
we told subjects in half of the groups the scores of all group members in Round 1. Since 
individuals knew their own score, this information allowed them to place themselves in the 
distribution and assess their chances of ranking high or low in Round 2.  We refer to this 
treatment as “full information” because it gives subjects all the information that we have relevant 
to assessing their chances of winning in the ensuing tournament.  In the other half of the 
experiments, we said nothing about how others performed, which we refer to as “no 
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information.”  In all treatments, we announced the Round 2 prize structures after Round 1 was 
complete. 
 
In Round 2 subjects competed in a tournament with three incentive treatments, each of 
which distributed $30 in total prizes to each group.  Our equal prize treatment gave each 
participant $5.00 regardless of their performance.  The only incentive was thus the intrinsic 
desire to solve mazes or to do well relative to others.  Our single prize treatment gave $30 to the 
top scorer and nothing to anyone else.  In the multiple prize condition, we gave out multiple 
differentiated prizes.  Out of the many ways to do this, we chose one that gave incentives to 
persons in all parts of the distribution of maze-solving skill as reflected in their Round 1 maze 
performances.  We gave the first-prize winner $15, the second-prize winner $7, the third-prize 
winner $5, the fourth-prize winner $2, and the fifth-prize winner $1.  The experiment took 
approximately 50 minutes. Mean total earnings, including the show-up fee, Round 1 earnings, 
and Round 2 earnings, was $20.45. 
 
We presented the exercise to the subjects in paper and pencil form.  We asked subjects to 
report the number of mazes they solved and told them that they had to solve them in the order 
they were presented in the packet.  Initially, we did not consider that subjects might cheat, say by 
jumping over a line to complete a maze, or that some would misreport the mazes solved by 
counting as completed mazes they solved after they had skipped one.  When we checked the first 
sets of maze packets, we found discrepancies between the number of mazes subjects reported 
solving and the mazes that our rules would count as solved.  We considered re-doing the 
experiment in ways that would rule out such activity (for instance by using a computer maze 
design) but realized that the potential for cheating serendipitously provides a second test of the 
effect of incentives on cheating in a tournament that differs greatly from the type of evidence in 
other experimental studies of cheating, such as studies on taxes.4  
 
Incentives and Potential Behavior in the Experiment 
 
                                                 
4 Studies on cheating in taxes ask subjects to choose a level of cheating or shirking and explicitly state the reward or 
punishment scheme they will face; see James Alm, Gary McClelland, and William Schulze (1992). 
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 The performance of individuals in maze-solving depends on their ability and the effort 
they expend.  The individual controls his or her effort.  With total mazes solved in the group as 
the measure of output, the relation between output and the prize structure in a tournament setting 
depends on the distribution of participants’ abilities, their perceived probability that increased 
effort will gain them a prize, and the prizes’ values.  In the model of Edward Lazear and Sherwin 
Rosen (1981), participants have equal ability and the optimal prize for winning mimics an 
optimal piece rate.  In the Moldovanu and Sela (2001) (M&S) model, which fits our 
experimental design better, participants have heterogeneous ability levels.5  In this analysis, 
multiple prizes can lead to greater output than a single prize because individuals with little 
chance of winning the single prize put in greater effort when they can win the 2nd, 3rd, or nth 
prize. The most able person may be less motivated by the presence of other prizes since the 
return to coming in first will be less than with a single prize but less able contestants will be 
motivated by the rewards from doing better in the lower part of the prize distribution.  M&S 
show that with a convex cost of effort function, total effort is maximized in a setting with 
multiple prizes.6   
 
The information structure of the tournament should affect behavior as well.  In the M&S 
model, individuals know the distribution function from which abilities are drawn. This enables 
those with high ability to assess their chances of winning.  Assuming that individuals in the “no 
information” conditions have correct priors over the distribution of ability, then the M&S 
information setting mimics the “no information” condition.  Our experiment has a stronger 
information condition: In the full information case, individuals know the realized values of the 
abilities of other contestants.  This approximates an alternative set of real-world conditions in 
which participants have a better idea of their potential for winning than in the M&S model where 
they only know the distribution function from which competitors are drawn.  This should affect 
the perceived probability that a given individual will win a prize – for instance, causing someone 
who is in a tournament with others with much higher Round 1 scores to put in low effort in the 
single prize condition as they perceive a low probability of winning it. 
 
                                                 
5 Vijay Krishna and John Morgan (1998) also study settings with multiple prizes. 
6 This is their Proposition 5, p. 249. 
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II. Findings  
 
 Table 1 summarizes the means and standard deviations of subjects’ scores in each 
treatment and both rounds of the experiment.7  Since we randomly assigned individuals to 
treatments and gave the same Round 1 piece rate incentive to all subjects, Round 1 scores should 
not differ noticeably among the groups.  The Round 1 means show the different groups solved 
similar numbers of mazes.  F-tests and pair-wise two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-tests confirm that 
there are no statistically different results in this round.8  The Round 2 means show noticeable 
differences in scores among the treatment groups, which are significant by F-tests and pair-wise 
two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-tests.  In the full information treatment, mean prizes solved rises 
from the equal prize to the multiple prize condition and then falls with the one prize treatment.  
In the no information treatment, the lowest mean score is in the equal prize group but the one 
prize group and the multiple prize group have similar mean outputs.9  Comparing the full 
information and no information treatments, mean mazes solved are higher in the equal prize and 
multiple prize treatments under full information (15.55 and 18.56) than under no information 
(12.88 and 16.36, respectively), which are statistically significant at p=.02 and p=.07, 
respectively.  By contrast, the results are not discernibly different under full information and 
under no information for the single prize treatment (16.10 vs. 16.53, respectively; p=.58).  
 
Regression Analysis 
 
                                                 
7 We specified that the “mazes you solve that follow mazes you skipped will not be included in your total number of 
mazes,” but some participants ignored this instruction and proceeded to solve mazes after failing to solve one, 
perhaps intending to go back and solve that one later. Thus, one measure of output is the number of mazes that 
subjects completed even when some solved mazes followed unsolved mazes. A second measure of output is the 
number of mazes a subject solved prior to skipping a maze.  The first measure provides a potentially better indicator 
of the effort induced by the treatment while the second follows our instructions.  We analyzed both output measures 
and obtained similar results. We present in the text the results from the first measure.  We exclude misreported 
mazes from the totals and examine them in section III. 
8 For all three possible pairs of conditions, the pairwise test shows p > 0.40. 
9 In the no information condition, the two-tailed Mann-Whitney test for the single prize vs. equal prize distribution 
shows p = .001; multiple vs. equal shows p = .008; equal vs. single shows p = .78.  In the full information condition, 
the two-tailed Mann-Whitney test for the single vs. equal prize group shows p = .73; multiple vs. equal shows p = 
.008; equal vs. single shows p = .04. 
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 We use regression analysis to probe the Table 1 finding that multiple prizes produce 
higher output for the full information case but not for the no information case.  We regressed the 
number of mazes solved in Round 2 on the number solved in Round 1 and dummy variables for 
treatments: 
R2i = β0+β1R1i+Iiβ+εi 
where R1 and R2 represent Round 1 and Round 2 score respectively, Ii is a vector of dummies 
representing the incentive treatments, ε is an error term, and i is an individual indicator. Table 2 
reports the estimated coefficients and standard errors relating Round 2 scores to Round 1 scores, 
the prize treatment and, where relevant, a dummy variable for full information.  The deleted 
group in all of the regressions is the equal prize treatment.  The estimated coefficients on the 
Round 1 score uniformly exceed 1.0, which indicates that individuals/groups with higher scores 
improved their scores by larger absolute amounts than those with lower scores.  Looking at 
individuals, those who solved more mazes in Round 1 tended to solve more mazes in Round 2 as 
well, which suggests that the Round 1 score is a reasonable indicator of the person’s maze 
solving ability or, alternatively, of their intrinsic effort independent of incentives. The coefficient 
on the full information treatment in Column 1 is positive, indicating that on average the 
provision of information improved performance.   
 
The key result from the Table 2 regressions is that output is highest under the multiple 
prize condition.  The regression coefficients in Column 1 for all treatments show a strong 
difference among the incentive treatments: the mazes solved by the equal prize group are 
substantially less than those solved by subjects in the other two treatments, and the multiple prize 
group has a statistically significantly higher number of mazes solved than the single prize group.  
When the sample is divided by information treatment in Columns 2 and 3, the difference in 
coefficients between the multiple prize and single prize treatment dummies is larger in the full 
information case (a difference of 1.72 in Column 3) than in the no information case (a difference 
of 0.26 in Column 2).  The maximum under the multiple prize treatment is stronger under full 
information.    
 
To examine the robustness of this result, we investigated other specifications.  We had 
data on the gender of subjects and added a female dummy variable to the regression, with little 
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impact on the other coefficients.10  We entered the square of Round 1 score along with Round 1 
score in the regressions, again without impacting the finding that output was highest in the 
middle inequality group.  We introduced the Round 1 score of the highest-scoring person in the 
group as an independent variable on the hypothesis that this could affect performances in the full 
information condition.11  We aggregated the mazes solved to the group level and regressed 
aggregate group Round 2 scores on the treatment dummies and aggregate group Round 1 scores.  
As an alternative specification, we calculated changes in the mean number of mazes solved from 
Round 1 to Round 2 for each of the treatments and used this as the dependent variable.  The 
same patterns remained significant (see Richard Freeman and Alexander Gelber 2006).  We 
investigated gender differences by estimating the models in Table 2 with the addition of a gender 
dummy and the interaction of that dummy with each of the five incentive treatments.  None of 
the interactions was significant at the 5% level.12 
 
Unpacking the results 
 
At the heart of the analysis linking outcomes to incentive treatments is the notion that 
different prize structures should affect individuals differently depending on their maze-solving 
skills, assuming they are aware of their skills relative to others in the tournament.  We investigate 
the impact of treatments on individuals in different positions in the maze-solving ability 
distribution by dividing the sample into those in the upper half of the distribution of mazes 
solved in Round 1 in the group in which they participated and those in the lower half of the 
group.  In this analysis we ran the regressions for the full information and no information groups 
together on Round 1 score and dummy variables for five treatments with the no information, 
                                                 
10 Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini’s (2003) findings suggest that women may perform differently in tournaments 
than men. 
11 In the full information single prize condition, a high top first-round score in a group lowered the second round 
scores of other participants.  The point estimate of the effect (-0.54) is large with a standard error of .10. By contrast, 
in the no information single prize condition, the point estimate is an insignificant -.12 with a standard error of .65.  
This suggests that when one person was far ahead of the rest, and this was known, subjects put forth substantially 
less effort. 
12 The same robustness checks also did not materially affect the Table 3 results. 
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equal prize treatment group deleted.13  With this specification the coefficient on the constant 
term reflects the deleted group while the other coefficients reflect deviations from that score.  
 
Table 3 shows the estimated regression coefficients and standard errors from this 
analysis. The coefficients under the columns labeled top half and bottom half of the Round 1 
distribution show different effects of the treatments.  Under full information, the single prize 
treatment is associated with a large, positive, and highly significant coefficient (6.31) in the top 
half of the distribution, but a much smaller and insignificant coefficient (.93) in the lower half of 
the distribution.  By contrast, there is only a modest and statistically insignificant difference 
between the effects of the multiple prize treatment on the two halves of the distribution (6.03 vs. 
5.29).  Knowledge of their low chance of winning seemingly discouraged people in the lower 
half of the distribution while encouraging those in the upper half.  As a result, the maximum 
associated with the multiple prize condition is most pronounced for the bottom half of the 
distribution.   
 
The results for the no information treatment are different.  Individuals in the top half of 
the distribution score more under both single prize and multiple prize incentives than individuals 
in the equal prize group.  There is little evidence of a maximum under multiple prizes in the 
bottom half of the distribution as the score for the multiple prize treatment just exceeds that for 
the equal prize and falls short of that for the single prize treatment.  Provision of information has 
its biggest effect on individuals in the bottom half of the Round 1 distribution of maze-solving 
scores.  Knowledge that they have little chance of winning a single large prize appears to 
discourage them.14  
 
One other pattern in the data requires explanation.  This is the higher scores of subjects in 
the full information equal prize group compared to the scores of subjects in the no information 
equal prize (deleted) group.  The unadjusted mean differences in Table 1 are significantly 
different in the two conditions, and a regression controlling for Round 1 score also shows a 
                                                 
13 The coefficients on Round 1 scores were similar for the groups analyzed separately, so this pooling does not 
distort the results. 
 
14 Freeman and Gelber (2006) report regressions with the addition of the person’s Round 1 score as an additional 
explanatory variable, which does not affect the main results.  
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significant difference.  Since subjects gained no money from solving more mazes in the equal 
prize treatment, pecuniary incentives cannot account for this result.  One possible explanation is 
that individuals at the low end realized they could do better in the full information treatment and 
tried harder due to intrinsic competitive motivation.  Niederle and Vesterlund’s (2007) finding 
that men respond more competitively to tournaments than women is consistent with the 
hypothesis that men are more subject to an intrinsic motivation effect.  Looking at our data by 
gender, we find a pattern consistent with this hypothesis: in the equal prize treatment men raised 
their scores more in the full information case than did women.  In the equal prize treatment the 
mean Round 1 to Round 2 gain in scores was 2.16 more in full information than in no 
information for men, whereas it was 1.30 more for women (p<.05). 
 
As a final check on the differential response to the treatments of subjects in different 
positions in the maze-scoring distribution, we report in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 the 
coefficients on outcomes for the person who scored highest in their group in Round 1 and the 
person who scored lowest in their group in Round 1.  In both the full information and no 
information cases, the individuals who did best in Round 1 increased their scores more in the 
multiple prize and single prize treatment than in the equal prize treatment, while those who did 
worst in Round 1 improved their scores most in the full information multiple prize treatment.  
Comparing the difference in scores between full information and no information, those with high 
scores increased their scores from the no information to the full information treatment by the 
greatest amount in the equal prize case and the smallest amount in the multiple prize case.  By 
contrast, the lowest scoring subjects in Round 1 increased their scores most from no to full 
information in the multiple prize treatment, presumably because they realized that they had a 
chance to win some reward from greater effort.  By contrast, they reduced their scores from the 
no information to the full information treatments in the single prize treatment, presumably 
because they realized they had little chance to win the single prize.15   
 
                                                 
15 In some situations, the top score from a group may matter rather than the sum of all the scores.  Using a group’s 
top score to measure output, we still find that multiple prizes produce the greatest output, though the difference 
between multiple prizes and the single prize is smaller than in the comparable regression in Table 3.  In other 
situations, the performance of the lower scoring individual may matter most.  Under full information, the multiple 
prize condition gives markedly higher results than the other treatments, due to the incentives that multiple prizes 
give in the lower part of the distribution.  See Freeman and Gelber (2006). 
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III. Incentives and Misreporting/Cheating  
 
By asking subjects to solve paper mazes where the subjects draw lines from the 
beginning of the maze to the end with a pencil, we unexpectedly created another test of how 
incentives affect behavior by opening the door for misreporting or cheating.16  Our instructions 
told subjects to solve the mazes in the order that they appeared in their packets and that "any 
mazes you solve that follow a maze you skipped will not be counted in your total number of 
mazes...."  We also told subjects that "solving a maze means drawing a continuous line from the 
place marked 'Start' to the place marked 'Finish,' without crossing any of the walls of the maze 
with your line."  Finally, we asked subjects to report the number of mazes they solved according 
to those rules.   
 
Reviewing the packets of solved mazes after the first set of experiments, we discovered 
that subjects sometimes reported more mazes solved than met our rules.  The vast majority of 
misreporting consisted of subjects starting a maze but not finishing it, then moving on to 
subsequent mazes in their maze packet, and reporting the subsequent mazes in their total number 
solved.  There were three other less frequent forms of misreporting. Some subjects completely 
skipped a maze, yet reported subsequent mazes they solved in the number solved; some subjects 
crossed one of the walls of a maze with a line, yet counted this maze among the total number 
they solved; and some subjects reported a different total number solved than the total they 
actually solved.  The results we report include all four types of cheating, but all types of cheating 
show similar patterns across treatments, and the results are robust to excluding the less frequent 
forms of cheating. 
 
The final two columns of Table 1 present summary statistics on the frequency of such 
misreporting.  In Round 1, the largest number of misreports occurred under the full information 
multiple prize treatment.  But F- or chi-squared tests of the effect of the treatments show no 
statistically significant difference among the groups in this round.  By contrast, the means for 
Round 2 show that misreporting is higher in the full information treatment than in the no 
                                                 
16 Breaking the rules of a maze solving experiment is not possible when subjects solve mazes on the computer, as in 
previous literature.   
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information treatment (p=.006).  This is presumably because people in full information have a 
better idea of how they might improve their chances of gaining a prize by misreporting.  In both 
the full information case and the no information case, the mean number of misreports is several 
times larger in the multiple prize and single prize treatments compared with the equal prize 
treatment.  In both the full information and no information setting, the largest number of 
misreports is associated with the multiple prize condition.  Thus incentives seem to work in a 
similar way in misreporting as well as they do in genuine maze solving. 
 
Table 4 presents the coefficients and standard errors from a Poisson regression in which 
the dependent variable is the number of misreports in Round 2.  We use the Poisson model 
because misreports are a relatively infrequent event.17  In the full information case, the 
regressions show that misreporting is greatest in the multiple prize setting, second-highest in the 
single prize setting, and lowest in the equal prize condition (Column 1).  Looking at behavior 
among subjects in the upper and lower halves of the distribution of maze-solving in Round 1, the 
regression coefficients in Columns 2 and 3 show that this result is due to much higher 
misreporting by individuals in the multiple and single prize treatments than those in the equal 
prize treatment for those at upper half of the distribution and a low number of misreports among 
individuals in the single prize treatment in the bottom half of the distribution. When a lot of prize 
money is at stake and participants know that they have a chance of winning, they are more likely 
to cheat to win it.  By contrast, there are no statistically significant differences in misreporting in 
the no information treatment.  Moreover, the percentage difference in cheating across treatments 
is greater than the percentage differences across treatments in output.18   
 
IV. Conclusion  
 
This paper has examined the impact of tournament prize structure and provision of 
information about individuals’ skill.  The first round of the experiment gave all participants the 
same piece rate incentive.  The second round varied the incentives and information about the 
                                                 
17 Negative binomial regressions show similar results to the Poisson regressions.  A linear model shows differences 
among the treatments with similar magnitudes to those implied by the unadjusted differences shown in Table 1.  
Adding individuals’ Round 1 score to the model does not appreciably change the results. 
18 This is consistent with Jacob and Levitt (2003) who find that cheating is extremely sensitive to the incentives to 
cheat. 
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number of mazes solved by participants in the pre-tournament round.  The primary finding is 
consistent with Moldovanu and Sela’s (2001) analysis that multiple prizes maximize total effort.  
The evidence that the multiple prize effect is stronger under full information than under no 
information goes beyond their model because our full information treatment gives individuals 
information not only about their own abilities but also about the realized distribution of the 
abilities of their competitors rather than knowledge or expectation about the general distribution 
of abilities.   
 
The results were strongest for individuals in the bottom half of the distribution, where 
output fell in the single prize treatment relative to the multiple prize treatment.  When individuals 
are aware of their ability relative to others, a single large prize does not motivate those at the 
bottom of the ability distribution, who have little chance of winning it.  They put forth more 
effort when they have a better chance to win more in a multiple prize setting.  Our analysis found 
that misreporting also followed similar patterns and was extremely sensitive to the information 
and incentive structure.  While previous laboratory investigations of cheating artificially asked 
subjects to choose a level of cheating, our experimental design offers a new way to detect 
cheating without alerting participants to the fact that their cheating will be detected by the 
experimenters.   The evidence that participants solved more mazes in the full information no 
inequality treatment than in the no information no inequality treatment suggests that behavior is 
affected by intrinsic motivation or some other psychological factor not typically examined in 
incentive models.   
 16 
 
References 
 
Alm, James, Gary McClelland, and William Schulze.  1992.  “Why do People Pay Taxes?”  
Journal of Public Economics, 48(1): 21-36. 
 
Bandiera, Oriana, Iwan Barankay, and Imran Rasul.  2005. “Social Preferences and the  
Response to Incentives: Evidence from Personnel Data.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 120 (3): 917-962. 
 
Bull, Clive, Andrew Schotter, and Keith Weigelt.  1987.  “Tournaments and Piece Rates: An  
Experimental Study.” Journal of Political Economy, 95(1): 1-33.  
 
Ehrenberg, Ronald, and Michael Bognanno.  1990.  “Do Tournaments Have Incentive  
Effects?” Journal of Political Economy, 98(6): 1307-1324. 
 
Freeman, Richard, and Alexander Gelber.  2006.  “Optimal Inequality/Optimal Incentives: 
Evidence from a Tournament.” NBER Working Paper 12588. 
 
Gneezy, Uri, and Aldo Rustichini.  2000.  “Pay enough or don’t pay at all.” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 115(2): 791-810. 
 
Gneezy, Uri, Muriel Niederle, and Aldo Rustichini. 2003.  “Performance in Competitive  
Environments: Gender Differences.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(3): 1049-
1074. 
 
Jacob, Brian, and Steven Levitt.  2003. “Rotten Apples: An investigation of the Prevalence and  
Predictors of Teacher Cheating.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(3): 843-877. 
 
Krishna, Vijay and John Morgan.  1998.  “The Winner-Take-All Principle in Small 
Tournaments.” Advances in Applied Microeconomics, 1998(7): 841-64. 
 17 
 
Lazear, Edward and Sherwin Rosen.  1981.  “Rank Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor 
Contracts.”  Journal of Political Economy, 89(5): 841-64. 
 
Moldovanu, Benny and Aner Sela.  2001.  “The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests.”  
American Economic Review, 91(3): 542-558. 
 
Müller, Weiland and Andrew Schotter.  2004.  “Workaholics and Dropouts in Optimal  
Organizations.”  New York University working paper. 
 
Nalbantian, Haig and Andrew Schotter.  1997.  “Productivity Under Group Incentives: An  
Experimental Study.”  American Economic Review, 87(3): 314-340.  
 
Niederle, Muriel, and Lise Vesterlund.  2007.  “Do Women Shy away from Competition?  Do  
Men Compete too Much?”  Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(3): 1067-1101. 
 
Phillips, Dave.  1988.  Space Age Mazes.  New York, NY: Dover.   
 
Phillips, Dave.  1988.  Animal Mazes.  New York, NY: Dover.   
 
 
 18 
Table 1 Means and standard deviations of individuals’ mazes solved and mazes misreported, by 
treatment  
Treatment Mean (SD) Mazes Solved Mean (SD) Mazes 
Misreported  
Full Information (1) Round 1  (2) Round 2 (3) Round 1 (4) Round 2 
   Equal prize 12.65 
(4.86) 
15.55    
(7.08) 
.09     
(.33) 
.18      
(.58) 
   Multiple prize 12.40 
(4.44) 
18.56 
(6.87) 
.13     
(.54) 
.51     
(1.44) 
   Single prize 11.74 
(5.24) 
16.10 
(7.88) 
.19     
(1.20) 
.46     
(1.15) 
No Information     
   Equal prize 12.46 
(4.68) 
12.88 
(5.62) 
.09     
(.33) 
.13     
(.49) 
   Multiple prize 11.91  
(5.27) 
16.36 
(7.89) 
.17     
(.84) 
.32    
(1.62) 
   Single prize 12.30 
(5.05) 
16.53    
(7.38) 
.12    
(.39) 
.23     
(.68) 
Source: Tabulated from the experiment described in text.  The sample size is 78 subjects for each 
of the six treatments shown, or 468 subjects total.  
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Table 2 Regression coefficients and standard errors for determinants of mazes solved in Round 
2 
 (1) All 
Participants 
(2) No 
Info 
(3) Full 
Info 
EQUAL -- -- -- 
MULTIPLE 3.69   
(.61)*** 
4.06   
(.80)*** 
3.30    
(.90)*** 
SINGLE 2.68     
(.60)*** 
3.80    
(.75)*** 
1.58   
(.91)* 
FULL INFO 1.44    
(.52)*** 
  
Round 1 
Score 
1.10    
(.04)*** 
1.06    
(.06)*** 
1.13   
(.05)** 
Constant -.30    
(.59) 
-.33    
(.75) 
1.23    
(.76) 
R-squared .59 .59 .58 
N 468 234 234 
The dependent variable is the number of mazes solved in Round 2.  EQUAL, MULTIPLE, and 
SINGLE represent dummies for the equal, multiple, and single prize conditions, respectively; 
FULL INFO represents a dummy for full information conditions.  “Round 1 score” is the total 
number of mazes an individual solved in Round 1.  Robust standard errors, clustered by group, 
are in parentheses.  *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** 5%; * 10%. 
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Table 3 Regression coefficients and standard errors for determinants of mazes solved in Round 
2, by position in Round 1  
 (1) Round 1 
Top Half 
(2) Round 1 
Bottom Half 
(3) Round 1 
Rank = 1 
(4) Round 1 
Rank = 6 
Full 
Information 
    
   EQUAL 3.55    
(1.05)*** 
1.07    
(.90) 
4.19    
(1.88)** 
1.65    
(1.09) 
   MULTIPLE 6.03    
(1.30)*** 
5.29    
(.99)*** 
7.46    
(1.90)*** 
5.46   
(1.32)*** 
   SINGLE 6.31    
(1.40)*** 
.93    
(.90) 
7.23    
(1.99)*** 
2.48    
(1.05)** 
No 
Information 
    
   EQUAL -- -- -- -- 
   MULTIPLE 5.65    
(1.07)*** 
1.94    
(.88)** 
6.14    
(2.17)*** 
1.56   
(1.02) 
   SINGLE 5.30    
(1.04)*** 
1.93    
(.99)* 
5.82    
(1.75)*** 
4.28    
(1.29)*** 
Round 1 
Score 
1.06    
(.07)*** 
.98    
(.07)*** 
.84     
(.12)*** 
.96    
(.10)*** 
Constant -1.22    
(1.09) 
1.54    
(.79)* 
2.04    
(2.19) 
.74    
(.92) 
     
R-Squared .47 .49 .42 .63 
# obs 254 214 94 71 
The participants’ Round 2 scores are regressed on dummies for each of the 6 treatments, their 
Round 1 score, and a constant term.  Column 1 displays results for a regression in which the 
sample is all participants with Round 1 score ranked between 1 and 3 (inclusive); Column 2 
displays results for a regression in which the sample is all participants with Round 1 ranks 4 to 6 
(inclusive).  The sample size is larger for the top half than the bottom half because tied scores 
were assigned the same rank; results are similar with other ways of assigning ties.  This is also 
the reason that the sample size is larger for those ranked 1 in Round 1 than those ranked 6 in 
Round 1.  Robust standard errors, clustered by group, are in parentheses.  *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level; ** 5%; * 10%. 
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Table 4 Poisson regression coefficients and standard errors for determinants of total number of 
mazes misreported in the Round 2                                 
 Full Information No Information 
 (1) All 
Subjects 
(2) Top 
Half 
(3) Bottom 
Half 
(4) All 
Subjects 
(5) Top 
Half 
(6) Bottom 
Half 
EQUAL -- -- -- -- -- -- 
MULTIPLE 1.01   
(.41)**   
1.29  
(.57)** 
.94    
(.49)* 
-.21    
(.58) 
.33    
(.79) 
-.50   
(.88)  
SINGLE .50 
(.43) 
1.75   
(.55)*** 
-.71    
(.82) 
.55    
(.44) 
.61    
(.76) 
.45    
(.53) 
Mazes 
Misreported 
in Round 1 
.38 
(.05)*** 
1.87    
(.87)** 
.46    
(.09)*** 
.74   
(.07)*** 
.85   
(.96) 
.72   
(.11)*** 
Constant -1.76 
(.35)*** 
-2.56   
(.50)*** 
-1.39   
(.41)*** 
-2.16    
(.33) 
-2.75   
(.70)*** 
-1.75   
(.41)*** 
# obs 234 127 107 234 127 107 
Log Pseudo-
Likelihood 
-177.52 -79.77 -88.16 -102.20 -40.41 -59.31 
The number of mazes misreported in Round 2 is regressed on dummies for the incentive 
conditions, the number of mazes misreported in Round 1, and a constant term.  Columns 1 and 4 
display results for a regression in which the sample is all participants; Columns 2 and 5 display 
results for a regression in which the sample is all participants with Round 1 ranks 1 to 3 
(inclusive); Columns 3 and 6 display results for a regression in which the sample is all 
participants with Round 1 ranks 4 to 6 (inclusive).  The sample size is larger for the top half than 
the bottom half because tied scores were assigned the same rank; results are similar with other 
ways of assigning ties.  Robust standard errors, clustered by group, are in parentheses.  *** 
denotes significance at the 1% level; ** 5%; * 10%. 
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Appendix 
Instructions (Round 1) 
Each of you has been given a packet of mazes.  Please do not turn this packet over until 
the room monitor says to start.  Please write your name on the back of this packet. 
"Solving" a maze means that you draw a continuous line from the place on the maze 
marked "Start" to the place marked "Finish," without crossing any of the walls of the maze with 
your line.  All of the mazes in your packets have solutions.  Please begin working on the first 
maze in the packet and work through the packet in order.  Begin working on a new maze only 
when you have finished solving the maze that preceded it in the packet. If you work out of order 
and skip at least one maze, you will not be given credit in your total number of mazes for mazes 
you solved that follow the maze you skipped.  We will check the accuracy of your solutions to 
the mazes.   
You will have 15 minutes to solve as many mazes as you can.  You will receive 20 cents 
for each maze you solve (on top of your guaranteed payment of $13 for showing up at the 
experiment).  If, over the course of this session, you make stray lines on your sheet that do not 
lead from the start of the maze to the finish, you are not required to erase these lines during the 
15-minute session itself, but you may erase them if you wish to do so.  
Each of you has received a packet of mazes that is identical to the packet each other 
participant has received.  It will not be announced at any point in the experiment which 
participant received which score in this session. 
Please do not talk to other participants while you are solving the mazes.  Also, please do 
not talk in the break between solving mazes in the packet you have been given and solving 
mazes in the next packet.  Please turn off your cellular phones before the experiment begins.   
If you have a question about these directions, please raise your hand now.   
Instructions (read by experimenter after Round 1) 
Please count the number of mazes that you solved correctly in the first session, and please 
write this number on the front of your maze packet with a circle around it.  If you skipped a 
maze, please do not include subsequent mazes solved in the total you report.  Please raise your 
hand when you have finished this, so that the room monitor can collect your packet from you. 
Only in the “Full Information” Treatments, Read: An experimenter will now give to each 
of you a list of the number of mazes each member of your group solved in the first session.  The 
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number that you solved has been circled, and the numbers that the other members of your group 
solved have not been circled.   
Instructions (Round 2) 
Each of you has been given a second packet of mazes.  Please write your name on the 
back of this packet.  Please do not turn this packet over and begin working on it until the room 
monitor says to start.   
"Solving" a maze means that you draw a continuous line from the place on the maze 
marked "Start" to the place marked "Finish," without crossing any of the walls of the maze with 
your line.  All of the mazes in your packets have solutions.  Please begin working on the first 
maze in the packet and work through the packet in order.  Begin working on a new maze only 
when you have finished solving the maze that preceded it in the packet. If you work out of order 
and skip at least one maze, you will not be given credit in your total number of mazes for mazes 
you solved that follow the maze you skipped.  We will check the accuracy of your solutions to 
the mazes. 
You will have 15 minutes to solve mazes in your packet.   
For “Equal prize” Treatments, read: 
 In this session, which is the final session of the experiment, you will receive $6, 
regardless of how many mazes you solve. 
For “Multiple Prize” Treatments, read: 
In this session, which is the final session of the experiment, you will be paid based on 
how many mazes you solve, in comparison with how many mazes the other participants solve.  If 
you solve the most mazes in this session out of the members of this group, you will receive $15, 
in addition to your show-up fee, plus what you earned in the first session.  If you solve the 
second-most mazes in this session out of the members of this group, you will receive $7, in 
addition to your show-up fee, plus what you earned in the first session.  If you solve the third-
most mazes in this session out of the members of this group, you will receive $5, in addition to 
your show-up fee, plus what you earned in the first session.  If you solve the fourth-most mazes 
in this session out of the members of this group, you will receive $2, in addition to your show-up 
fee, plus what you earned in the first session.  If you solve the fifth-most mazes in this session 
out of the members of this group, you will receive $1, in addition to your show-up fee, plus what 
you earned in the first session.  If you solve the sixth-most mazes in this session out of the 
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members of this group, you will receive only your show-up fee, plus what you earned in the first 
session.   
Your payment from this session (the second session) will be based only on how many 
mazes you solve in the second session.  The number you solved in the first session is irrelevant 
to the payment you receive in this session.     
For “Single Prize” Treatments, read: 
You will have 15 minutes to solve mazes in your packet.  In this session, which is the 
final session of the experiment, you will be paid based on how many mazes you solve, in 
comparison with how many mazes the other participants solve.  If you solve the most mazes in 
this session out of the members of this group, you will receive $30, in addition to your show-up 
fee, plus what you earned in the first session.  Everyone else will receive only their show-up fee, 
plus what they earned in the previous session.  
Your payment from this session (the second session) will be based only on how many 
mazes you solve in the second session.  The number you solved in the first session is irrelevant 
to the payment you receive in this session.     
In all treatments, read: 
Each of you has received a packet of mazes that is identical to the packet each other 
participant has received.  It will not be announced at any point in the experiment which 
participant received which score in this session.  Please do not talk while you are solving the 
mazes.   
If you have a question about these directions, please raise your hand now.  
 
 
